Swiftdiff options
Diffstat (limited to '3rdParty/Unbound/src/src/validator/validator.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | 3rdParty/Unbound/src/src/validator/validator.c | 2957 |
1 files changed, 2957 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/3rdParty/Unbound/src/src/validator/validator.c b/3rdParty/Unbound/src/src/validator/validator.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c05a8cf --- /dev/null +++ b/3rdParty/Unbound/src/src/validator/validator.c @@ -0,0 +1,2957 @@ +/* + * validator/validator.c - secure validator DNS query response module + * + * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved. + * + * This software is open source. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may + * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/** + * \file + * + * This file contains a module that performs validation of DNS queries. + * According to RFC 4034. + */ +#include "config.h" +#include <ldns/ldns.h> +#include "validator/validator.h" +#include "validator/val_anchor.h" +#include "validator/val_kcache.h" +#include "validator/val_kentry.h" +#include "validator/val_utils.h" +#include "validator/val_nsec.h" +#include "validator/val_nsec3.h" +#include "validator/val_neg.h" +#include "validator/val_sigcrypt.h" +#include "validator/autotrust.h" +#include "services/cache/dns.h" +#include "util/data/dname.h" +#include "util/module.h" +#include "util/log.h" +#include "util/net_help.h" +#include "util/regional.h" +#include "util/config_file.h" +#include "util/fptr_wlist.h" + +/* forward decl for cache response and normal super inform calls of a DS */ +static void process_ds_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, + struct val_qstate* vq, int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, + struct query_info* qinfo, struct sock_list* origin); + +/** fill up nsec3 key iterations config entry */ +static int +fill_nsec3_iter(struct val_env* ve, char* s, int c) +{ + char* e; + int i; + free(ve->nsec3_keysize); + free(ve->nsec3_maxiter); + ve->nsec3_keysize = (size_t*)calloc(sizeof(size_t), (size_t)c); + ve->nsec3_maxiter = (size_t*)calloc(sizeof(size_t), (size_t)c); + if(!ve->nsec3_keysize || !ve->nsec3_maxiter) { + log_err("out of memory"); + return 0; + } + for(i=0; i<c; i++) { + ve->nsec3_keysize[i] = (size_t)strtol(s, &e, 10); + if(s == e) { + log_err("cannot parse: %s", s); + return 0; + } + s = e; + ve->nsec3_maxiter[i] = (size_t)strtol(s, &e, 10); + if(s == e) { + log_err("cannot parse: %s", s); + return 0; + } + s = e; + if(i>0 && ve->nsec3_keysize[i-1] >= ve->nsec3_keysize[i]) { + log_err("nsec3 key iterations not ascending: %d %d", + (int)ve->nsec3_keysize[i-1], + (int)ve->nsec3_keysize[i]); + return 0; + } + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator nsec3cfg keysz %d mxiter %d", + (int)ve->nsec3_keysize[i], (int)ve->nsec3_maxiter[i]); + } + return 1; +} + +/** apply config settings to validator */ +static int +val_apply_cfg(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* val_env, + struct config_file* cfg) +{ + int c; + val_env->bogus_ttl = (uint32_t)cfg->bogus_ttl; + val_env->clean_additional = cfg->val_clean_additional; + val_env->permissive_mode = cfg->val_permissive_mode; + if(!env->anchors) + env->anchors = anchors_create(); + if(!env->anchors) { + log_err("out of memory"); + return 0; + } + if(!val_env->kcache) + val_env->kcache = key_cache_create(cfg); + if(!val_env->kcache) { + log_err("out of memory"); + return 0; + } + env->key_cache = val_env->kcache; + if(!anchors_apply_cfg(env->anchors, cfg)) { + log_err("validator: error in trustanchors config"); + return 0; + } + val_env->date_override = cfg->val_date_override; + val_env->skew_min = cfg->val_sig_skew_min; + val_env->skew_max = cfg->val_sig_skew_max; + c = cfg_count_numbers(cfg->val_nsec3_key_iterations); + if(c < 1 || (c&1)) { + log_err("validator: unparseable or odd nsec3 key " + "iterations: %s", cfg->val_nsec3_key_iterations); + return 0; + } + val_env->nsec3_keyiter_count = c/2; + if(!fill_nsec3_iter(val_env, cfg->val_nsec3_key_iterations, c/2)) { + log_err("validator: cannot apply nsec3 key iterations"); + return 0; + } + if(!val_env->neg_cache) + val_env->neg_cache = val_neg_create(cfg, + val_env->nsec3_maxiter[val_env->nsec3_keyiter_count-1]); + if(!val_env->neg_cache) { + log_err("out of memory"); + return 0; + } + env->neg_cache = val_env->neg_cache; + return 1; +} + +int +val_init(struct module_env* env, int id) +{ + struct val_env* val_env = (struct val_env*)calloc(1, + sizeof(struct val_env)); + if(!val_env) { + log_err("malloc failure"); + return 0; + } + env->modinfo[id] = (void*)val_env; + env->need_to_validate = 1; + val_env->permissive_mode = 0; + lock_basic_init(&val_env->bogus_lock); + lock_protect(&val_env->bogus_lock, &val_env->num_rrset_bogus, + sizeof(val_env->num_rrset_bogus)); + if(!val_apply_cfg(env, val_env, env->cfg)) { + log_err("validator: could not apply configuration settings."); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +void +val_deinit(struct module_env* env, int id) +{ + struct val_env* val_env; + if(!env || !env->modinfo[id]) + return; + val_env = (struct val_env*)env->modinfo[id]; + lock_basic_destroy(&val_env->bogus_lock); + anchors_delete(env->anchors); + env->anchors = NULL; + key_cache_delete(val_env->kcache); + neg_cache_delete(val_env->neg_cache); + free(val_env->nsec3_keysize); + free(val_env->nsec3_maxiter); + free(val_env); + env->modinfo[id] = NULL; +} + +/** fill in message structure */ +static struct val_qstate* +val_new_getmsg(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq) +{ + if(!qstate->return_msg || qstate->return_rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { + /* create a message to verify */ + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "constructing reply for validation"); + vq->orig_msg = (struct dns_msg*)regional_alloc(qstate->region, + sizeof(struct dns_msg)); + if(!vq->orig_msg) + return NULL; + vq->orig_msg->qinfo = qstate->qinfo; + vq->orig_msg->rep = (struct reply_info*)regional_alloc( + qstate->region, sizeof(struct reply_info)); + if(!vq->orig_msg->rep) + return NULL; + memset(vq->orig_msg->rep, 0, sizeof(struct reply_info)); + vq->orig_msg->rep->flags = (uint16_t)(qstate->return_rcode&0xf) + |BIT_QR|BIT_RA|(qstate->query_flags|(BIT_CD|BIT_RD)); + vq->orig_msg->rep->qdcount = 1; + } else { + vq->orig_msg = qstate->return_msg; + } + vq->qchase = qstate->qinfo; + /* chase reply will be an edited (sub)set of the orig msg rrset ptrs */ + vq->chase_reply = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, + vq->orig_msg->rep, + sizeof(struct reply_info) - sizeof(struct rrset_ref)); + if(!vq->chase_reply) + return NULL; + vq->chase_reply->rrsets = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, + vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets, sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*) + * vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count); + if(!vq->chase_reply->rrsets) + return NULL; + vq->rrset_skip = 0; + return vq; +} + +/** allocate new validator query state */ +static struct val_qstate* +val_new(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id) +{ + struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)regional_alloc( + qstate->region, sizeof(*vq)); + log_assert(!qstate->minfo[id]); + if(!vq) + return NULL; + memset(vq, 0, sizeof(*vq)); + qstate->minfo[id] = vq; + vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; + return val_new_getmsg(qstate, vq); +} + +/** + * Exit validation with an error status + * + * @param qstate: query state + * @param id: validator id. + * @return false, for use by caller to return to stop processing. + */ +static int +val_error(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id) +{ + qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; + qstate->return_rcode = LDNS_RCODE_SERVFAIL; + return 0; +} + +/** + * Check to see if a given response needs to go through the validation + * process. Typical reasons for this routine to return false are: CD bit was + * on in the original request, or the response is a kind of message that + * is unvalidatable (i.e., SERVFAIL, REFUSED, etc.) + * + * @param qstate: query state. + * @param ret_rc: rcode for this message (if noerror - examine ret_msg). + * @param ret_msg: return msg, can be NULL; look at rcode instead. + * @return true if the response could use validation (although this does not + * mean we can actually validate this response). + */ +static int +needs_validation(struct module_qstate* qstate, int ret_rc, + struct dns_msg* ret_msg) +{ + int rcode; + + /* If the CD bit is on in the original request, then we don't bother to + * validate anything.*/ + if(qstate->query_flags & BIT_CD) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "not validating response due to CD bit"); + return 0; + } + + if(ret_rc != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR || !ret_msg) + rcode = ret_rc; + else rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(ret_msg->rep->flags); + + if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate non-answer, rcode %s", + ldns_lookup_by_id(ldns_rcodes, rcode)? + ldns_lookup_by_id(ldns_rcodes, rcode)->name:"??"); + return 0; + } + + /* cannot validate positive RRSIG response. (negatives can) */ + if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG && + rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && ret_msg && + ret_msg->rep->an_numrrsets > 0) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate RRSIG, no sigs on sigs."); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +/** + * Check to see if the response has already been validated. + * @param ret_msg: return msg, can be NULL + * @return true if the response has already been validated + */ +static int +already_validated(struct dns_msg* ret_msg) +{ + /* validate unchecked, and re-validate bogus messages */ + if (ret_msg && ret_msg->rep->security > sec_status_bogus) + { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "response has already been validated: %s", + sec_status_to_string(ret_msg->rep->security)); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * Generate a request for DNS data. + * + * @param qstate: query state that is the parent. + * @param id: module id. + * @param name: what name to query for. + * @param namelen: length of name. + * @param qtype: query type. + * @param qclass: query class. + * @param flags: additional flags, such as the CD bit (BIT_CD), or 0. + * @return false on alloc failure. + */ +static int +generate_request(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id, uint8_t* name, + size_t namelen, uint16_t qtype, uint16_t qclass, uint16_t flags) +{ + struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)qstate->minfo[id]; + struct module_qstate* newq; + struct query_info ask; + ask.qname = name; + ask.qname_len = namelen; + ask.qtype = qtype; + ask.qclass = qclass; + log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "generate request", &ask); + fptr_ok(fptr_whitelist_modenv_attach_sub(qstate->env->attach_sub)); + if(!(*qstate->env->attach_sub)(qstate, &ask, + (uint16_t)(BIT_RD|flags), 0, &newq)){ + log_err("Could not generate request: out of memory"); + return 0; + } + /* newq; validator does not need state created for that + * query, and its a 'normal' for iterator as well */ + if(newq) { + /* add our blacklist to the query blacklist */ + sock_list_merge(&newq->blacklist, newq->region, + vq->chain_blacklist); + } + qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_subquery; + return 1; +} + +/** + * Prime trust anchor for use. + * Generate and dispatch a priming query for the given trust anchor. + * The trust anchor can be DNSKEY or DS and does not have to be signed. + * + * @param qstate: query state. + * @param vq: validator query state. + * @param id: module id. + * @param toprime: what to prime. + * @return false on a processing error. + */ +static int +prime_trust_anchor(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, + int id, struct trust_anchor* toprime) +{ + int ret = generate_request(qstate, id, toprime->name, toprime->namelen, + LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, toprime->dclass, BIT_CD); + if(!ret) { + log_err("Could not prime trust anchor: out of memory"); + return 0; + } + /* ignore newq; validator does not need state created for that + * query, and its a 'normal' for iterator as well */ + vq->wait_prime_ta = 1; /* to elicit PRIME_RESP_STATE processing + from the validator inform_super() routine */ + /* store trust anchor name for later lookup when prime returns */ + vq->trust_anchor_name = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, + toprime->name, toprime->namelen); + vq->trust_anchor_len = toprime->namelen; + vq->trust_anchor_labs = toprime->namelabs; + if(!vq->trust_anchor_name) { + log_err("Could not prime trust anchor: out of memory"); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +/** + * Validate if the ANSWER and AUTHORITY sections contain valid rrsets. + * They must be validly signed with the given key. + * Tries to validate ADDITIONAL rrsets as well, but only to check them. + * Allows unsigned CNAME after a DNAME that expands the DNAME. + * + * Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the + * trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been + * completed. + * + * @param qstate: query state. + * @param env: module env for verify. + * @param ve: validator env for verify. + * @param qchase: query that was made. + * @param chase_reply: answer to validate. + * @param key_entry: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches + * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). + * @return false if any of the rrsets in the an or ns sections of the message + * fail to verify. The message is then set to bogus. + */ +static int +validate_msg_signatures(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct module_env* env, + struct val_env* ve, struct query_info* qchase, + struct reply_info* chase_reply, struct key_entry_key* key_entry) +{ + uint8_t* sname; + size_t i, slen; + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; + enum sec_status sec; + int dname_seen = 0; + char* reason = NULL; + + /* validate the ANSWER section */ + for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) { + s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; + /* Skip the CNAME following a (validated) DNAME. + * Because of the normalization routines in the iterator, + * there will always be an unsigned CNAME following a DNAME + * (unless qtype=DNAME). */ + if(dname_seen && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) { + dname_seen = 0; + /* CNAME was synthesized by our own iterator */ + /* since the DNAME verified, mark the CNAME as secure */ + ((struct packed_rrset_data*)s->entry.data)->security = + sec_status_secure; + ((struct packed_rrset_data*)s->entry.data)->trust = + rrset_trust_validated; + continue; + } + + /* Verify the answer rrset */ + sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason); + /* If the (answer) rrset failed to validate, then this + * message is BAD. */ + if(sec != sec_status_secure) { + log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "validator: response " + "has failed ANSWER rrset:", s->rk.dname, + ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); + errinf(qstate, reason); + if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) + errinf(qstate, "for CNAME"); + else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) + errinf(qstate, "for DNAME"); + errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + return 0; + } + + /* Notice a DNAME that should be followed by an unsigned + * CNAME. */ + if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME && + ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) { + dname_seen = 1; + } + } + + /* validate the AUTHORITY section */ + for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ + chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { + s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; + sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason); + /* If anything in the authority section fails to be secure, + * we have a bad message. */ + if(sec != sec_status_secure) { + log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "validator: response " + "has failed AUTHORITY rrset:", s->rk.dname, + ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); + errinf(qstate, reason); + errinf_rrset(qstate, s); + errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + return 0; + } + } + + /* attempt to validate the ADDITIONAL section rrsets */ + if(!ve->clean_additional) + return 1; + for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; + i<chase_reply->rrset_count; i++) { + s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; + /* only validate rrs that have signatures with the key */ + /* leave others unchecked, those get removed later on too */ + val_find_rrset_signer(s, &sname, &slen); + if(sname && query_dname_compare(sname, key_entry->name)==0) + (void)val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, + &reason); + /* the additional section can fail to be secure, + * it is optional, check signature in case we need + * to clean the additional section later. */ + } + + return 1; +} + +/** + * Detect wrong truncated response (say from BIND 9.6.1 that is forwarding + * and saw the NS record without signatures from a referral). + * The positive response has a mangled authority section. + * Remove that authority section and the additional section. + * @param rep: reply + * @return true if a wrongly truncated response. + */ +static int +detect_wrongly_truncated(struct reply_info* rep) +{ + size_t i; + /* only NS in authority, and it is bogus */ + if(rep->ns_numrrsets != 1 || rep->an_numrrsets == 0) + return 0; + if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[ rep->an_numrrsets ]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) + return 0; + if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[ rep->an_numrrsets ] + ->entry.data)->security == sec_status_secure) + return 0; + /* answer section is present and secure */ + for(i=0; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) { + if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[ i ] + ->entry.data)->security != sec_status_secure) + return 0; + } + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "truncating to minimal response"); + return 1; +} + + +/** + * Given a "positive" response -- a response that contains an answer to the + * question, and no CNAME chain, validate this response. + * + * The answer and authority RRsets must already be verified as secure. + * + * @param env: module env for verify. + * @param ve: validator env for verify. + * @param qchase: query that was made. + * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. + * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches + * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). + */ +static void +validate_positive_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, + struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, + struct key_entry_key* kkey) +{ + uint8_t* wc = NULL; + int wc_NSEC_ok = 0; + int nsec3s_seen = 0; + size_t i; + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; + + /* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the answer itself */ + for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) { + s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; + + /* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard + * expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be + * made in the authority section. */ + if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc)) { + log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Positive response has " + "inconsistent wildcard sigs:", s->rk.dname, + ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + return; + } + } + + /* validate the AUTHORITY section as well - this will generally be + * the NS rrset (which could be missing, no problem) */ + for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ + chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { + s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; + + /* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a + * (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove + * that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard + * was used. */ + if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { + if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) { + wc_NSEC_ok = 1; + } + /* if not, continue looking for proof */ + } + + /* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and + * we have NSEC3 records */ + if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { + nsec3s_seen = 1; + } + } + + /* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already + * proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3 + * records. */ + if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen) { + enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve, + chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets, + chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, wc); + if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Positive wildcard response is " + "insecure"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; + return; + } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) + wc_NSEC_ok = 1; + } + + /* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard + * response, fail. */ + if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) { + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "positive response was wildcard " + "expansion and did not prove original data " + "did not exist"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + return; + } + + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated positive response"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; +} + +/** + * Validate a NOERROR/NODATA signed response -- a response that has a + * NOERROR Rcode but no ANSWER section RRsets. This consists of making + * certain that the authority section NSEC/NSEC3s proves that the qname + * does exist and the qtype doesn't. + * + * The answer and authority RRsets must already be verified as secure. + * + * @param env: module env for verify. + * @param ve: validator env for verify. + * @param qchase: query that was made. + * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. + * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches + * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). + */ +static void +validate_nodata_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, + struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, + struct key_entry_key* kkey) +{ + /* Since we are here, there must be nothing in the ANSWER section to + * validate. */ + /* (Note: CNAME/DNAME responses will not directly get here -- + * instead, they are chased down into indiviual CNAME validations, + * and at the end of the cname chain a POSITIVE, or CNAME_NOANSWER + * validation.) */ + + /* validate the AUTHORITY section */ + int has_valid_nsec = 0; /* If true, then the NODATA has been proven.*/ + uint8_t* ce = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. This is the + proven closest encloser. */ + uint8_t* wc = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. wildcard nsec */ + int nsec3s_seen = 0; /* nsec3s seen */ + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; + size_t i; + + for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ + chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { + s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; + /* If we encounter an NSEC record, try to use it to prove + * NODATA. + * This needs to handle the ENT NODATA case. */ + if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { + if(nsec_proves_nodata(s, qchase, &wc)) { + has_valid_nsec = 1; + /* sets wc-encloser if wildcard applicable */ + } + if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname)) { + ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s); + } + if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; + return; + } + } else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { + nsec3s_seen = 1; + } + } + + /* check to see if we have a wildcard NODATA proof. */ + + /* The wildcard NODATA is 1 NSEC proving that qname does not exist + * (and also proving what the closest encloser is), and 1 NSEC + * showing the matching wildcard, which must be *.closest_encloser. */ + if(wc && !ce) + has_valid_nsec = 0; + else if(wc && ce) { + if(query_dname_compare(wc, ce) != 0) { + has_valid_nsec = 0; + } + } + + if(!has_valid_nsec && nsec3s_seen) { + enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_nodata(env, ve, + chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets, + chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey); + if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NODATA response is insecure"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; + return; + } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) + has_valid_nsec = 1; + } + + if(!has_valid_nsec) { + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NODATA response failed to prove NODATA " + "status with NSEC/NSEC3"); + if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) + log_dns_msg("Failed NODATA", qchase, chase_reply); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + return; + } + + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated NODATA response."); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; +} + +/** + * Validate a NAMEERROR signed response -- a response that has a NXDOMAIN + * Rcode. + * This consists of making certain that the authority section NSEC proves + * that the qname doesn't exist and the covering wildcard also doesn't exist.. + * + * The answer and authority RRsets must have already been verified as secure. + * + * @param env: module env for verify. + * @param ve: validator env for verify. + * @param qchase: query that was made. + * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. + * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches + * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). + */ +static void +validate_nameerror_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, + struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, + struct key_entry_key* kkey) +{ + int has_valid_nsec = 0; + int has_valid_wnsec = 0; + int nsec3s_seen = 0; + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; + size_t i; + + for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ + chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { + s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; + if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { + if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname)) + has_valid_nsec = 1; + if(val_nsec_proves_no_wc(s, qchase->qname, + qchase->qname_len)) + has_valid_wnsec = 1; + if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; + return; + } + } else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) + nsec3s_seen = 1; + } + + if((!has_valid_nsec || !has_valid_wnsec) && nsec3s_seen) { + /* use NSEC3 proof, both answer and auth rrsets, in case + * NSEC3s end up in the answer (due to qtype=NSEC3 or so) */ + chase_reply->security = nsec3_prove_nameerror(env, ve, + chase_reply->rrsets, chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ + chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey); + if(chase_reply->security != sec_status_secure) { + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response failed nsec, " + "nsec3 proof was %s", sec_status_to_string( + chase_reply->security)); + return; + } + has_valid_nsec = 1; + has_valid_wnsec = 1; + } + + /* If the message fails to prove either condition, it is bogus. */ + if(!has_valid_nsec) { + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response has failed to prove: " + "qname does not exist"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + return; + } + + if(!has_valid_wnsec) { + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response has failed to prove: " + "covering wildcard does not exist"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + return; + } + + /* Otherwise, we consider the message secure. */ + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated NAME ERROR response."); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; +} + +/** + * Given a referral response, validate rrsets and take least trusted rrset + * as the current validation status. + * + * Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the + * trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been + * completed. + * + * @param chase_reply: answer to validate. + */ +static void +validate_referral_response(struct reply_info* chase_reply) +{ + size_t i; + enum sec_status s; + /* message security equals lowest rrset security */ + chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; + for(i=0; i<chase_reply->rrset_count; i++) { + s = ((struct packed_rrset_data*)chase_reply->rrsets[i] + ->entry.data)->security; + if(s < chase_reply->security) + chase_reply->security = s; + } + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validated part of referral response as %s", + sec_status_to_string(chase_reply->security)); +} + +/** + * Given an "ANY" response -- a response that contains an answer to a + * qtype==ANY question, with answers. This does no checking that all + * types are present. + * + * NOTE: it may be possible to get parent-side delegation point records + * here, which won't all be signed. Right now, this routine relies on the + * upstream iterative resolver to not return these responses -- instead + * treating them as referrals. + * + * NOTE: RFC 4035 is silent on this issue, so this may change upon + * clarification. Clarification draft -05 says to not check all types are + * present. + * + * Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the + * trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been + * completed. + * + * @param env: module env for verify. + * @param ve: validator env for verify. + * @param qchase: query that was made. + * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. + * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches + * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). + */ +static void +validate_any_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, + struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, + struct key_entry_key* kkey) +{ + /* all answer and auth rrsets already verified */ + /* but check if a wildcard response is given, then check NSEC/NSEC3 + * for qname denial to see if wildcard is applicable */ + uint8_t* wc = NULL; + int wc_NSEC_ok = 0; + int nsec3s_seen = 0; + size_t i; + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; + + if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_ANY) { + log_err("internal error: ANY validation called for non-ANY"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + return; + } + + /* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the answer itself */ + for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) { + s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; + + /* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard + * expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be + * made in the authority section. */ + if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc)) { + log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Positive ANY response" + " has inconsistent wildcard sigs:", + s->rk.dname, ntohs(s->rk.type), + ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + return; + } + } + + /* if it was a wildcard, check for NSEC/NSEC3s in both answer + * and authority sections (NSEC may be moved to the ANSWER section) */ + if(wc != NULL) + for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; + i++) { + s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; + + /* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a + * (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove + * that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard + * was used. */ + if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { + if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) { + wc_NSEC_ok = 1; + } + /* if not, continue looking for proof */ + } + + /* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and + * we have NSEC3 records */ + if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { + nsec3s_seen = 1; + } + } + + /* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already + * proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3 + * records. */ + if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen) { + /* look both in answer and auth section for NSEC3s */ + enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve, + chase_reply->rrsets, + chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, + qchase, kkey, wc); + if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Positive ANY wildcard response is " + "insecure"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; + return; + } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) + wc_NSEC_ok = 1; + } + + /* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard + * response, fail. */ + if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) { + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "positive ANY response was wildcard " + "expansion and did not prove original data " + "did not exist"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + return; + } + + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated positive ANY response"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; +} + +/** + * Validate CNAME response, or DNAME+CNAME. + * This is just like a positive proof, except that this is about a + * DNAME+CNAME. Possible wildcard proof. + * Difference with positive proof is that this routine refuses + * wildcarded DNAMEs. + * + * The answer and authority rrsets must already be verified as secure. + * + * @param env: module env for verify. + * @param ve: validator env for verify. + * @param qchase: query that was made. + * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. + * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches + * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). + */ +static void +validate_cname_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, + struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, + struct key_entry_key* kkey) +{ + uint8_t* wc = NULL; + int wc_NSEC_ok = 0; + int nsec3s_seen = 0; + size_t i; + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; + + /* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the CNAME (+DNAME) */ + for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) { + s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; + + /* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard + * expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be + * made in the authority section. */ + if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc)) { + log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Cname response has " + "inconsistent wildcard sigs:", s->rk.dname, + ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + return; + } + + /* Refuse wildcarded DNAMEs rfc 4597. + * Do not follow a wildcarded DNAME because + * its synthesized CNAME expansion is underdefined */ + if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME && + ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME && wc) { + log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "cannot validate a " + "wildcarded DNAME:", s->rk.dname, + ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + return; + } + } + + /* AUTHORITY section */ + for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ + chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { + s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; + + /* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a + * (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove + * that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard + * was used. */ + if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { + if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) { + wc_NSEC_ok = 1; + } + /* if not, continue looking for proof */ + } + + /* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and + * we have NSEC3 records */ + if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { + nsec3s_seen = 1; + } + } + + /* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already + * proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3 + * records. */ + if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen) { + enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve, + chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets, + chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, wc); + if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "wildcard CNAME response is " + "insecure"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; + return; + } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) + wc_NSEC_ok = 1; + } + + /* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard + * response, fail. */ + if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) { + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAME response was wildcard " + "expansion and did not prove original data " + "did not exist"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + return; + } + + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated CNAME response"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; +} + +/** + * Validate CNAME NOANSWER response, no more data after a CNAME chain. + * This can be a NODATA or a NAME ERROR case, but not both at the same time. + * We don't know because the rcode has been set to NOERROR by the CNAME. + * + * The answer and authority rrsets must already be verified as secure. + * + * @param env: module env for verify. + * @param ve: validator env for verify. + * @param qchase: query that was made. + * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. + * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches + * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). + */ +static void +validate_cname_noanswer_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, + struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, + struct key_entry_key* kkey) +{ + int nodata_valid_nsec = 0; /* If true, then NODATA has been proven.*/ + uint8_t* ce = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. This is the + proven closest encloser. */ + uint8_t* wc = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. wildcard nsec */ + int nxdomain_valid_nsec = 0; /* if true, namerror has been proven */ + int nxdomain_valid_wnsec = 0; + int nsec3s_seen = 0; /* nsec3s seen */ + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; + size_t i; + + /* the AUTHORITY section */ + for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ + chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { + s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; + + /* If we encounter an NSEC record, try to use it to prove + * NODATA. This needs to handle the ENT NODATA case. + * Also try to prove NAMEERROR, and absence of a wildcard */ + if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { + if(nsec_proves_nodata(s, qchase, &wc)) { + nodata_valid_nsec = 1; + /* set wc encloser if wildcard applicable */ + } + if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname)) { + ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s); + nxdomain_valid_nsec = 1; + } + if(val_nsec_proves_no_wc(s, qchase->qname, + qchase->qname_len)) + nxdomain_valid_wnsec = 1; + if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; + return; + } + } else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { + nsec3s_seen = 1; + } + } + + /* check to see if we have a wildcard NODATA proof. */ + + /* The wildcard NODATA is 1 NSEC proving that qname does not exists + * (and also proving what the closest encloser is), and 1 NSEC + * showing the matching wildcard, which must be *.closest_encloser. */ + if(wc && !ce) + nodata_valid_nsec = 0; + else if(wc && ce) { + if(query_dname_compare(wc, ce) != 0) { + nodata_valid_nsec = 0; + } + } + if(nxdomain_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_wnsec) { + /* name error is missing wildcard denial proof */ + nxdomain_valid_nsec = 0; + } + + if(nodata_valid_nsec && nxdomain_valid_nsec) { + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAMEchain to noanswer proves that name " + "exists and not exists, bogus"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + return; + } + if(!nodata_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_nsec && nsec3s_seen) { + int nodata; + enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_nxornodata(env, ve, + chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets, + chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, &nodata); + if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "CNAMEchain to noanswer response " + "is insecure"); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; + return; + } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) { + if(nodata) + nodata_valid_nsec = 1; + else nxdomain_valid_nsec = 1; + } + } + + if(!nodata_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_nsec) { + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAMEchain to noanswer response failed " + "to prove status with NSEC/NSEC3"); + if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) + log_dns_msg("Failed CNAMEnoanswer", qchase, chase_reply); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + return; + } + + if(nodata_valid_nsec) + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated CNAME chain to a " + "NODATA response."); + else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated CNAME chain to a " + "NAMEERROR response."); + chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; +} + +/** + * Process init state for validator. + * Process the INIT state. First tier responses start in the INIT state. + * This is where they are vetted for validation suitability, and the initial + * key search is done. + * + * Currently, events the come through this routine will be either promoted + * to FINISHED/CNAME_RESP (no validation needed), FINDKEY (next step to + * validation), or will be (temporarily) retired and a new priming request + * event will be generated. + * + * @param qstate: query state. + * @param vq: validator query state. + * @param ve: validator shared global environment. + * @param id: module id. + * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if + * not. + */ +static int +processInit(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, + struct val_env* ve, int id) +{ + uint8_t* lookup_name; + size_t lookup_len; + struct trust_anchor* anchor; + enum val_classification subtype = val_classify_response( + qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo, &vq->qchase, + vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip); + if(vq->restart_count > VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "restart count exceeded"); + return val_error(qstate, id); + } + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator classification %s", + val_classification_to_string(subtype)); + if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL && + vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count) { + /* referral uses the rrset name as qchase, to find keys for + * that rrset */ + vq->qchase.qname = vq->orig_msg->rep-> + rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.dname; + vq->qchase.qname_len = vq->orig_msg->rep-> + rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.dname_len; + vq->qchase.qtype = ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep-> + rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.type); + vq->qchase.qclass = ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep-> + rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.rrset_class); + } + lookup_name = vq->qchase.qname; + lookup_len = vq->qchase.qname_len; + /* for type DS look at the parent side for keys/trustanchor */ + /* also for NSEC not at apex */ + if(vq->qchase.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS || + (vq->qchase.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC && + vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count > vq->rrset_skip && + ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.type) == + LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC && + !(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]-> + rk.flags&PACKED_RRSET_NSEC_AT_APEX))) { + dname_remove_label(&lookup_name, &lookup_len); + } + + val_mark_indeterminate(vq->chase_reply, qstate->env->anchors, + qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env); + vq->key_entry = NULL; + vq->empty_DS_name = NULL; + vq->ds_rrset = 0; + anchor = anchors_lookup(qstate->env->anchors, + lookup_name, lookup_len, vq->qchase.qclass); + + /* Determine the signer/lookup name */ + val_find_signer(subtype, &vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, + vq->rrset_skip, &vq->signer_name, &vq->signer_len); + if(vq->signer_name != NULL && + !dname_subdomain_c(lookup_name, vq->signer_name)) { + log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "this signer name is not a parent " + "of lookupname, omitted", vq->signer_name, 0, 0); + vq->signer_name = NULL; + } + if(vq->signer_name == NULL) { + log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "no signer, using", lookup_name, + 0, 0); + } else { + lookup_name = vq->signer_name; + lookup_len = vq->signer_len; + log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "signer is", lookup_name, 0, 0); + } + + /* for NXDOMAIN it could be signed by a parent of the trust anchor */ + if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR && vq->signer_name && + anchor && dname_strict_subdomain_c(anchor->name, lookup_name)){ + lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); + anchor = anchors_lookup(qstate->env->anchors, + lookup_name, lookup_len, vq->qchase.qclass); + if(!anchor) { /* unsigned parent denies anchor*/ + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "unsigned parent zone denies" + " trust anchor, indeterminate"); + vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_indeterminate; + vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; + return 1; + } + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "trust anchor NXDOMAIN by signed parent"); + } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE && + qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY && + query_dname_compare(lookup_name, qstate->qinfo.qname) == 0) { + /* is a DNSKEY so lookup a bit higher since we want to + * get it from a parent or from trustanchor */ + dname_remove_label(&lookup_name, &lookup_len); + } + + if(vq->rrset_skip > 0 || subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME || + subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) { + /* extract this part of orig_msg into chase_reply for + * the eventual VALIDATE stage */ + val_fill_reply(vq->chase_reply, vq->orig_msg->rep, + vq->rrset_skip, lookup_name, lookup_len, + vq->signer_name); + if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) + log_dns_msg("chased extract", &vq->qchase, + vq->chase_reply); + } + + vq->key_entry = key_cache_obtain(ve->kcache, lookup_name, lookup_len, + vq->qchase.qclass, qstate->region, *qstate->env->now); + + /* there is no key(from DLV) and no trust anchor */ + if(vq->key_entry == NULL && anchor == NULL) { + /*response isn't under a trust anchor, so we cannot validate.*/ + vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_indeterminate; + /* go to finished state to cache this result */ + vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; + return 1; + } + /* if not key, or if keyentry is *above* the trustanchor, i.e. + * the keyentry is based on another (higher) trustanchor */ + else if(vq->key_entry == NULL || (anchor && + dname_strict_subdomain_c(anchor->name, vq->key_entry->name))) { + /* trust anchor is an 'unsigned' trust anchor */ + if(anchor && anchor->numDS == 0 && anchor->numDNSKEY == 0) { + vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; + val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, anchor->name, + qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env); + lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); + vq->dlv_checked=1; /* skip DLV check */ + /* go to finished state to cache this result */ + vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; + return 1; + } + /* fire off a trust anchor priming query. */ + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "prime trust anchor"); + if(!prime_trust_anchor(qstate, vq, id, anchor)) { + lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); + return val_error(qstate, id); + } + lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); + /* and otherwise, don't continue processing this event. + * (it will be reactivated when the priming query returns). */ + vq->state = VAL_FINDKEY_STATE; + return 0; + } + if(anchor) { + lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); + } + + if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) { + /* response is under a null key, so we cannot validate + * However, we do set the status to INSECURE, since it is + * essentially proven insecure. */ + vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; + val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry->name, + qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env); + /* go to finished state to cache this result */ + vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; + return 1; + } else if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) { + /* key is bad, chain is bad, reply is bogus */ + errinf_dname(qstate, "key for validation", vq->key_entry->name); + errinf(qstate, "is marked as invalid"); + if(key_entry_get_reason(vq->key_entry)) { + errinf(qstate, "because of a previous"); + errinf(qstate, key_entry_get_reason(vq->key_entry)); + } + /* no retries, stop bothering the authority until timeout */ + vq->restart_count = VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT; + vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; + return 1; + } + + /* otherwise, we have our "closest" cached key -- continue + * processing in the next state. */ + vq->state = VAL_FINDKEY_STATE; + return 1; +} + +/** + * Process the FINDKEY state. Generally this just calculates the next name + * to query and either issues a DS or a DNSKEY query. It will check to see + * if the correct key has already been reached, in which case it will + * advance the event to the next state. + * + * @param qstate: query state. + * @param vq: validator query state. + * @param id: module id. + * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if + * not. + */ +static int +processFindKey(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, int id) +{ + uint8_t* target_key_name, *current_key_name; + size_t target_key_len; + int strip_lab; + + log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: FindKey", &vq->qchase); + /* We know that state.key_entry is not 0 or bad key -- if it were, + * then previous processing should have directed this event to + * a different state. + * It could be an isnull key, which signals that a DLV was just + * done and the DNSKEY after the DLV failed with dnssec-retry state + * and the DNSKEY has to be performed again. */ + log_assert(vq->key_entry && !key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)); + if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) { + if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, + vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, + vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD)) { + log_err("mem error generating DNSKEY request"); + return val_error(qstate, id); + } + return 0; + } + + target_key_name = vq->signer_name; + target_key_len = vq->signer_len; + if(!target_key_name) { + target_key_name = vq->qchase.qname; + target_key_len = vq->qchase.qname_len; + } + + current_key_name = vq->key_entry->name; + + /* If our current key entry matches our target, then we are done. */ + if(query_dname_compare(target_key_name, current_key_name) == 0) { + vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; + return 1; + } + + if(vq->empty_DS_name) { + /* if the last empty nonterminal/emptyDS name we detected is + * below the current key, use that name to make progress + * along the chain of trust */ + if(query_dname_compare(target_key_name, + vq->empty_DS_name) == 0) { + /* do not query for empty_DS_name again */ + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Cannot retrieve DS for signature"); + errinf(qstate, "no signatures"); + errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); + vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; + return 1; + } + current_key_name = vq->empty_DS_name; + } + + log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "current keyname", current_key_name, + LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN); + log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "target keyname", target_key_name, + LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN); + /* assert we are walking down the DNS tree */ + if(!dname_subdomain_c(target_key_name, current_key_name)) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "bad signer name"); + vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; + return 1; + } + /* so this value is >= -1 */ + strip_lab = dname_count_labels(target_key_name) - + dname_count_labels(current_key_name) - 1; + log_assert(strip_lab >= -1); + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "striplab %d", strip_lab); + if(strip_lab > 0) { + dname_remove_labels(&target_key_name, &target_key_len, + strip_lab); + } + log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "next keyname", target_key_name, + LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN); + + /* The next step is either to query for the next DS, or to query + * for the next DNSKEY. */ + if(vq->ds_rrset) + log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "DS RRset", vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN); + else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No DS RRset"); + + if(vq->ds_rrset && query_dname_compare(vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, + vq->key_entry->name) != 0) { + if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, + vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, + vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD)) { + log_err("mem error generating DNSKEY request"); + return val_error(qstate, id); + } + return 0; + } + + if(!vq->ds_rrset || query_dname_compare(vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, + target_key_name) != 0) { + /* check if there is a cache entry : pick up an NSEC if + * there is no DS, check if that NSEC has DS-bit unset, and + * thus can disprove the secure delagation we seek. + * We can then use that NSEC even in the absence of a SOA + * record that would be required by the iterator to supply + * a completely protocol-correct response. + * Uses negative cache for NSEC3 lookup of DS responses. */ + /* only if cache not blacklisted, of course */ + struct dns_msg* msg; + if(!qstate->blacklist && !vq->chain_blacklist && + (msg=val_find_DS(qstate->env, target_key_name, + target_key_len, vq->qchase.qclass, qstate->region, + vq->key_entry->name)) ) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Process cached DS response"); + process_ds_response(qstate, vq, id, LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR, + msg, &msg->qinfo, NULL); + return 1; /* continue processing ds-response results */ + } + if(!generate_request(qstate, id, target_key_name, + target_key_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, vq->qchase.qclass, + BIT_CD)) { + log_err("mem error generating DS request"); + return val_error(qstate, id); + } + return 0; + } + + /* Otherwise, it is time to query for the DNSKEY */ + if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, + vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, + vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD)) { + log_err("mem error generating DNSKEY request"); + return val_error(qstate, id); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Process the VALIDATE stage, the init and findkey stages are finished, + * and the right keys are available to validate the response. + * Or, there are no keys available, in order to invalidate the response. + * + * After validation, the status is recorded in the message and rrsets, + * and finished state is started. + * + * @param qstate: query state. + * @param vq: validator query state. + * @param ve: validator shared global environment. + * @param id: module id. + * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if + * not. + */ +static int +processValidate(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, + struct val_env* ve, int id) +{ + enum val_classification subtype; + + if(!vq->key_entry) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate: no key entry, failed"); + return val_error(qstate, id); + } + + /* This is the default next state. */ + vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; + + /* Unsigned responses must be underneath a "null" key entry.*/ + if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) { + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Verified that %sresponse is INSECURE", + vq->signer_name?"":"unsigned "); + vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; + val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry->name, + qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env); + key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry, qstate); + return 1; + } + + if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) { + log_nametypeclass(VERB_DETAIL, "Could not establish a chain " + "of trust to keys for", vq->key_entry->name, + LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, vq->key_entry->key_class); + vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + errinf(qstate, "while building chain of trust"); + if(vq->restart_count >= VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) + key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry, qstate); + return 1; + } + + /* signerName being null is the indicator that this response was + * unsigned */ + if(vq->signer_name == NULL) { + log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "processValidate: state has no " + "signer name", &vq->qchase); + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Could not establish validation of " + "INSECURE status of unsigned response."); + errinf(qstate, "no signatures"); + errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); + vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; + return 1; + } + subtype = val_classify_response(qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo, + &vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip); + + /* check signatures in the message; + * answer and authority must be valid, additional is only checked. */ + if(!validate_msg_signatures(qstate, qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase, + vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry)) { + /* workaround bad recursor out there that truncates (even + * with EDNS4k) to 512 by removing RRSIG from auth section + * for positive replies*/ + if((subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE || subtype == VAL_CLASS_ANY + || subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) && + detect_wrongly_truncated(vq->orig_msg->rep)) { + /* truncate the message some more */ + vq->orig_msg->rep->ns_numrrsets = 0; + vq->orig_msg->rep->ar_numrrsets = 0; + vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count = + vq->orig_msg->rep->an_numrrsets; + vq->chase_reply->ns_numrrsets = 0; + vq->chase_reply->ar_numrrsets = 0; + vq->chase_reply->rrset_count = + vq->chase_reply->an_numrrsets; + qstate->errinf = NULL; + } + else { + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Validate: message contains " + "bad rrsets"); + return 1; + } + } + + switch(subtype) { + case VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE: + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a positive response"); + validate_positive_response(qstate->env, ve, + &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry); + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(positive): %s", + sec_status_to_string( + vq->chase_reply->security)); + break; + + case VAL_CLASS_NODATA: + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a nodata response"); + validate_nodata_response(qstate->env, ve, + &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry); + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(nodata): %s", + sec_status_to_string( + vq->chase_reply->security)); + break; + + case VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR: + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a nxdomain response"); + validate_nameerror_response(qstate->env, ve, + &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry); + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(nxdomain): %s", + sec_status_to_string( + vq->chase_reply->security)); + break; + + case VAL_CLASS_CNAME: + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a cname response"); + validate_cname_response(qstate->env, ve, + &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry); + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(cname): %s", + sec_status_to_string( + vq->chase_reply->security)); + break; + + case VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER: + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a cname noanswer " + "response"); + validate_cname_noanswer_response(qstate->env, ve, + &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry); + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(cname_noanswer): %s", + sec_status_to_string( + vq->chase_reply->security)); + break; + + case VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL: + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a referral response"); + validate_referral_response(vq->chase_reply); + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(referral): %s", + sec_status_to_string( + vq->chase_reply->security)); + break; + + case VAL_CLASS_ANY: + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a positive ANY " + "response"); + validate_any_response(qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase, + vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry); + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(positive_any): %s", + sec_status_to_string( + vq->chase_reply->security)); + break; + + default: + log_err("validate: unhandled response subtype: %d", + subtype); + } + if(vq->chase_reply->security == sec_status_bogus) { + if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) + errinf(qstate, "wildcard"); + else errinf(qstate, val_classification_to_string(subtype)); + errinf(qstate, "proof failed"); + errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); + } + + return 1; +} + +/** + * Init DLV check. + * Called when a query is determined by other trust anchors to be insecure + * (or indeterminate). Then we look if there is a key in the DLV. + * Performs aggressive negative cache check to see if there is no key. + * Otherwise, spawns a DLV query, and changes to the DLV wait state. + * + * @param qstate: query state. + * @param vq: validator query state. + * @param ve: validator shared global environment. + * @param id: module id. + * @return true if there is no DLV. + * false: processing is finished for the validator operate(). + * This function may exit in three ways: + * o no DLV (agressive cache), so insecure. (true) + * o error - stop processing (false) + * o DLV lookup was started, stop processing (false) + */ +static int +val_dlv_init(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, + struct val_env* ve, int id) +{ + uint8_t* nm; + size_t nm_len; + /* there must be a DLV configured */ + log_assert(qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor); + /* this bool is true to avoid looping in the DLV checks */ + log_assert(vq->dlv_checked); + + /* init the DLV lookup variables */ + vq->dlv_lookup_name = NULL; + vq->dlv_lookup_name_len = 0; + vq->dlv_insecure_at = NULL; + vq->dlv_insecure_at_len = 0; + + /* Determine the name for which we want to lookup DLV. + * This name is for the current message, or + * for the current RRset for CNAME, referral subtypes. + * If there is a signer, use that, otherwise the domain name */ + if(vq->signer_name) { + nm = vq->signer_name; + nm_len = vq->signer_len; + } else { + /* use qchase */ + nm = vq->qchase.qname; + nm_len = vq->qchase.qname_len; + if(vq->qchase.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS) + dname_remove_label(&nm, &nm_len); + } + log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "DLV init look", nm, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, + vq->qchase.qclass); + log_assert(nm && nm_len); + /* sanity check: no DLV lookups below the DLV anchor itself. + * Like, an securely insecure delegation there makes no sense. */ + if(dname_subdomain_c(nm, qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name)) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV lookup within DLV repository denied"); + return 1; + } + /* concat name (minus root label) + dlv name */ + vq->dlv_lookup_name_len = nm_len - 1 + + qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->namelen; + vq->dlv_lookup_name = regional_alloc(qstate->region, + vq->dlv_lookup_name_len); + if(!vq->dlv_lookup_name) { + log_err("Out of memory preparing DLV lookup"); + return val_error(qstate, id); + } + memmove(vq->dlv_lookup_name, nm, nm_len-1); + memmove(vq->dlv_lookup_name+nm_len-1, + qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name, + qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->namelen); + log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "DLV name", vq->dlv_lookup_name, + LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV, vq->qchase.qclass); + + /* determine where the insecure point was determined, the DLV must + * be equal or below that to continue building the trust chain + * down. May be NULL if no trust chain was built yet */ + nm = NULL; + if(vq->key_entry && key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) { + nm = vq->key_entry->name; + nm_len = vq->key_entry->namelen; + } + if(nm) { + vq->dlv_insecure_at_len = nm_len - 1 + + qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->namelen; + vq->dlv_insecure_at = regional_alloc(qstate->region, + vq->dlv_insecure_at_len); + if(!vq->dlv_insecure_at) { + log_err("Out of memory preparing DLV lookup"); + return val_error(qstate, id); + } + memmove(vq->dlv_insecure_at, nm, nm_len-1); + memmove(vq->dlv_insecure_at+nm_len-1, + qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name, + qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->namelen); + log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "insecure_at", + vq->dlv_insecure_at, 0, vq->qchase.qclass); + } + + /* If we can find the name in the aggressive negative cache, + * give up; insecure is the answer */ + while(val_neg_dlvlookup(ve->neg_cache, vq->dlv_lookup_name, + vq->dlv_lookup_name_len, vq->qchase.qclass, + qstate->env->rrset_cache, *qstate->env->now)) { + /* go up */ + dname_remove_label(&vq->dlv_lookup_name, + &vq->dlv_lookup_name_len); + /* too high? */ + if(!dname_subdomain_c(vq->dlv_lookup_name, + qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name)) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "ask above dlv repo"); + return 1; /* Above the repo is insecure */ + } + /* above chain of trust? */ + if(vq->dlv_insecure_at && !dname_subdomain_c( + vq->dlv_lookup_name, vq->dlv_insecure_at)) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "ask above insecure endpoint"); + return 1; + } + } + + /* perform a lookup for the DLV; with validation */ + vq->state = VAL_DLVLOOKUP_STATE; + if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->dlv_lookup_name, + vq->dlv_lookup_name_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV, + vq->qchase.qclass, 0)) { + return val_error(qstate, id); + } + + /* Find the closest encloser DLV from the repository. + * then that is used to build another chain of trust + * This may first require a query 'too low' that has NSECs in + * the answer, from which we determine the closest encloser DLV. + * When determine the closest encloser, skip empty nonterminals, + * since we want a nonempty node in the DLV repository. */ + + return 0; +} + +/** + * The Finished state. The validation status (good or bad) has been determined. + * + * @param qstate: query state. + * @param vq: validator query state. + * @param ve: validator shared global environment. + * @param id: module id. + * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if + * not. + */ +static int +processFinished(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, + struct val_env* ve, int id) +{ + enum val_classification subtype = val_classify_response( + qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo, &vq->qchase, + vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip); + + /* if the result is insecure or indeterminate and we have not + * checked the DLV yet, check the DLV */ + if((vq->chase_reply->security == sec_status_insecure || + vq->chase_reply->security == sec_status_indeterminate) && + qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor && !vq->dlv_checked) { + vq->dlv_checked = 1; + if(!val_dlv_init(qstate, vq, ve, id)) + return 0; + } + + /* store overall validation result in orig_msg */ + if(vq->rrset_skip == 0) + vq->orig_msg->rep->security = vq->chase_reply->security; + else if(vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->an_numrrsets + + vq->orig_msg->rep->ns_numrrsets) { + /* ignore sec status of additional section if a referral + * type message skips there and + * use the lowest security status as end result. */ + if(vq->chase_reply->security < vq->orig_msg->rep->security) + vq->orig_msg->rep->security = + vq->chase_reply->security; + } + + if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) { + /* for a referral, move to next unchecked rrset and check it*/ + vq->rrset_skip = val_next_unchecked(vq->orig_msg->rep, + vq->rrset_skip); + if(vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count) { + /* and restart for this rrset */ + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: go to next rrset"); + vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_unchecked; + vq->dlv_checked = 0; /* can do DLV for this RR */ + vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; + return 1; + } + /* referral chase is done */ + } + if(vq->chase_reply->security != sec_status_bogus && + subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) { + /* chase the CNAME; process next part of the message */ + if(!val_chase_cname(&vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, + &vq->rrset_skip)) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: failed to chase CNAME"); + vq->orig_msg->rep->security = sec_status_bogus; + } else { + /* restart process for new qchase at rrset_skip */ + log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: chased to", + &vq->qchase); + vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_unchecked; + vq->dlv_checked = 0; /* can do DLV for this RR */ + vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; + return 1; + } + } + + if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure) { + /* If the message is secure, check that all rrsets are + * secure (i.e. some inserted RRset for CNAME chain with + * a different signer name). And drop additional rrsets + * that are not secure (if clean-additional option is set) */ + /* this may cause the msg to be marked bogus */ + val_check_nonsecure(ve, vq->orig_msg->rep); + if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure) { + log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validation success", + &qstate->qinfo); + } + } + + /* if the result is bogus - set message ttl to bogus ttl to avoid + * endless bogus revalidation */ + if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_bogus) { + /* see if we can try again to fetch data */ + if(vq->restart_count < VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { + int restart_count = vq->restart_count+1; + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validation failed, " + "blacklist and retry to fetch data"); + val_blacklist(&qstate->blacklist, qstate->region, + qstate->reply_origin, 0); + qstate->reply_origin = NULL; + qstate->errinf = NULL; + memset(vq, 0, sizeof(*vq)); + vq->restart_count = restart_count; + vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "pass back to next module"); + qstate->ext_state[id] = module_restart_next; + return 0; + } + + vq->orig_msg->rep->ttl = ve->bogus_ttl; + vq->orig_msg->rep->prefetch_ttl = + PREFETCH_TTL_CALC(vq->orig_msg->rep->ttl); + if(qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 1 && + !qstate->env->cfg->val_log_squelch) { + if(qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level < 2) + log_query_info(0, "validation failure", + &qstate->qinfo); + else { + char* err = errinf_to_str(qstate); + if(err) log_info("%s", err); + free(err); + } + } + /* If we are in permissive mode, bogus gets indeterminate */ + if(ve->permissive_mode) + vq->orig_msg->rep->security = sec_status_indeterminate; + } + + /* store results in cache */ + if(qstate->query_flags&BIT_RD) { + if(!dns_cache_store(qstate->env, &vq->orig_msg->qinfo, + vq->orig_msg->rep, 0, qstate->prefetch_leeway, NULL)) { + log_err("out of memory caching validator results"); + } + } else { + /* for a referral, store the verified RRsets */ + /* and this does not get prefetched, so no leeway */ + if(!dns_cache_store(qstate->env, &vq->orig_msg->qinfo, + vq->orig_msg->rep, 1, 0, NULL)) { + log_err("out of memory caching validator results"); + } + } + qstate->return_rcode = LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR; + qstate->return_msg = vq->orig_msg; + qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished; + return 0; +} + +/** + * The DLVLookup state. Process DLV lookups. + * + * @param qstate: query state. + * @param vq: validator query state. + * @param ve: validator shared global environment. + * @param id: module id. + * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if + * not. + */ +static int +processDLVLookup(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, + struct val_env* ve, int id) +{ + /* see if this we are ready to continue normal resolution */ + /* we may need more DLV lookups */ + if(vq->dlv_status==dlv_error) + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV woke up with status dlv_error"); + else if(vq->dlv_status==dlv_success) + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV woke up with status dlv_success"); + else if(vq->dlv_status==dlv_ask_higher) + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV woke up with status dlv_ask_higher"); + else if(vq->dlv_status==dlv_there_is_no_dlv) + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV woke up with status dlv_there_is_no_dlv"); + else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV woke up with status unknown"); + + if(vq->dlv_status == dlv_error) { + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "failed DLV lookup"); + return val_error(qstate, id); + } else if(vq->dlv_status == dlv_success) { + uint8_t* nm; + size_t nmlen; + /* chain continues with DNSKEY, continue in FINDKEY */ + vq->state = VAL_FINDKEY_STATE; + + /* strip off the DLV suffix from the name; could result in . */ + log_assert(dname_subdomain_c(vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, + qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name)); + nmlen = vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len - + qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->namelen + 1; + nm = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, + vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, nmlen); + if(!nm) { + log_err("Out of memory in DLVLook"); + return val_error(qstate, id); + } + nm[nmlen-1] = 0; + + vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname = nm; + vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len = nmlen; + + /* create a nullentry for the key so the dnskey lookup + * can be retried after a validation failure for it */ + vq->key_entry = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, + nm, nmlen, vq->qchase.qclass, 0, 0); + if(!vq->key_entry) { + log_err("Out of memory in DLVLook"); + return val_error(qstate, id); + } + + if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, + vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, + vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD)) { + log_err("mem error generating DNSKEY request"); + return val_error(qstate, id); + } + return 0; + } else if(vq->dlv_status == dlv_there_is_no_dlv) { + /* continue with the insecure result we got */ + vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; + return 1; + } + log_assert(vq->dlv_status == dlv_ask_higher); + + /* ask higher, make sure we stay in DLV repo, below dlv_at */ + if(!dname_subdomain_c(vq->dlv_lookup_name, + qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name)) { + /* just like, there is no DLV */ + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "ask above dlv repo"); + vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; + return 1; + } + if(vq->dlv_insecure_at && !dname_subdomain_c(vq->dlv_lookup_name, + vq->dlv_insecure_at)) { + /* already checked a chain lower than dlv_lookup_name */ + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "ask above insecure endpoint"); + log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "enpt", vq->dlv_insecure_at, 0, 0); + vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; + return 1; + } + + /* check negative cache before making new request */ + if(val_neg_dlvlookup(ve->neg_cache, vq->dlv_lookup_name, + vq->dlv_lookup_name_len, vq->qchase.qclass, + qstate->env->rrset_cache, *qstate->env->now)) { + /* does not exist, go up one (go higher). */ + dname_remove_label(&vq->dlv_lookup_name, + &vq->dlv_lookup_name_len); + /* limit number of labels, limited number of recursion */ + return processDLVLookup(qstate, vq, ve, id); + } + + if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->dlv_lookup_name, + vq->dlv_lookup_name_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV, + vq->qchase.qclass, 0)) { + return val_error(qstate, id); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Handle validator state. + * If a method returns true, the next state is started. If false, then + * processing will stop. + * @param qstate: query state. + * @param vq: validator query state. + * @param ve: validator shared global environment. + * @param id: module id. + */ +static void +val_handle(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, + struct val_env* ve, int id) +{ + int cont = 1; + while(cont) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "val handle processing q with state %s", + val_state_to_string(vq->state)); + switch(vq->state) { + case VAL_INIT_STATE: + cont = processInit(qstate, vq, ve, id); + break; + case VAL_FINDKEY_STATE: + cont = processFindKey(qstate, vq, id); + break; + case VAL_VALIDATE_STATE: + cont = processValidate(qstate, vq, ve, id); + break; + case VAL_FINISHED_STATE: + cont = processFinished(qstate, vq, ve, id); + break; + case VAL_DLVLOOKUP_STATE: + cont = processDLVLookup(qstate, vq, ve, id); + break; + default: + log_warn("validator: invalid state %d", + vq->state); + cont = 0; + break; + } + } +} + +void +val_operate(struct module_qstate* qstate, enum module_ev event, int id, + struct outbound_entry* outbound) +{ + struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; + struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)qstate->minfo[id]; + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "validator[module %d] operate: extstate:%s " + "event:%s", id, strextstate(qstate->ext_state[id]), + strmodulevent(event)); + log_query_info(VERB_QUERY, "validator operate: query", + &qstate->qinfo); + if(vq && qstate->qinfo.qname != vq->qchase.qname) + log_query_info(VERB_QUERY, "validator operate: chased to", + &vq->qchase); + (void)outbound; + if(event == module_event_new || + (event == module_event_pass && vq == NULL)) { + /* pass request to next module, to get it */ + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: pass to next module"); + qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_module; + return; + } + if(event == module_event_moddone) { + /* check if validation is needed */ + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: nextmodule returned"); + if(!needs_validation(qstate, qstate->return_rcode, + qstate->return_msg)) { + /* no need to validate this */ + if(qstate->return_msg) + qstate->return_msg->rep->security = + sec_status_indeterminate; + qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished; + return; + } + if(already_validated(qstate->return_msg)) { + qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished; + return; + } + /* qclass ANY should have validation result from spawned + * queries. If we get here, it is bogus or an internal error */ + if(qstate->qinfo.qclass == LDNS_RR_CLASS_ANY) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate classANY: bogus"); + if(qstate->return_msg) + qstate->return_msg->rep->security = + sec_status_bogus; + qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished; + return; + } + /* create state to start validation */ + qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; /* override this */ + if(!vq) { + vq = val_new(qstate, id); + if(!vq) { + log_err("validator: malloc failure"); + qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; + return; + } + } else if(!vq->orig_msg) { + if(!val_new_getmsg(qstate, vq)) { + log_err("validator: malloc failure"); + qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; + return; + } + } + val_handle(qstate, vq, ve, id); + return; + } + if(event == module_event_pass) { + qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; /* override this */ + /* continue processing, since val_env exists */ + val_handle(qstate, vq, ve, id); + return; + } + log_err("validator: bad event %s", strmodulevent(event)); + qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; + return; +} + +/** + * Evaluate the response to a priming request. + * + * @param dnskey_rrset: DNSKEY rrset (can be NULL if none) in prime reply. + * (this rrset is allocated in the wrong region, not the qstate). + * @param ta: trust anchor. + * @param qstate: qstate that needs key. + * @param id: module id. + * @return new key entry or NULL on allocation failure. + * The key entry will either contain a validated DNSKEY rrset, or + * represent a Null key (query failed, but validation did not), or a + * Bad key (validation failed). + */ +static struct key_entry_key* +primeResponseToKE(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, + struct trust_anchor* ta, struct module_qstate* qstate, int id) +{ + struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; + struct key_entry_key* kkey = NULL; + enum sec_status sec = sec_status_unchecked; + char* reason = NULL; + int downprot = 1; + + if(!dnskey_rrset) { + log_nametypeclass(VERB_OPS, "failed to prime trust anchor -- " + "could not fetch DNSKEY rrset", + ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass); + if(qstate->env->cfg->harden_dnssec_stripped) { + errinf(qstate, "no DNSKEY rrset"); + kkey = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, ta->name, + ta->namelen, ta->dclass, BOGUS_KEY_TTL, + *qstate->env->now); + } else kkey = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, ta->name, + ta->namelen, ta->dclass, NULL_KEY_TTL, + *qstate->env->now); + if(!kkey) { + log_err("out of memory: allocate fail prime key"); + return NULL; + } + return kkey; + } + /* attempt to verify with trust anchor DS and DNSKEY */ + kkey = val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(qstate->region, qstate->env, ve, + dnskey_rrset, ta->ds_rrset, ta->dnskey_rrset, downprot, + &reason); + if(!kkey) { + log_err("out of memory: verifying prime TA"); + return NULL; + } + if(key_entry_isgood(kkey)) + sec = sec_status_secure; + else + sec = sec_status_bogus; + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate keys with anchor(DS): %s", + sec_status_to_string(sec)); + + if(sec != sec_status_secure) { + log_nametypeclass(VERB_OPS, "failed to prime trust anchor -- " + "DNSKEY rrset is not secure", + ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass); + /* NOTE: in this case, we should probably reject the trust + * anchor for longer, perhaps forever. */ + if(qstate->env->cfg->harden_dnssec_stripped) { + errinf(qstate, reason); + kkey = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, ta->name, + ta->namelen, ta->dclass, BOGUS_KEY_TTL, + *qstate->env->now); + } else kkey = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, ta->name, + ta->namelen, ta->dclass, NULL_KEY_TTL, + *qstate->env->now); + if(!kkey) { + log_err("out of memory: allocate null prime key"); + return NULL; + } + return kkey; + } + + log_nametypeclass(VERB_DETAIL, "Successfully primed trust anchor", + ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass); + return kkey; +} + +/** + * In inform supers, with the resulting message and rcode and the current + * keyset in the super state, validate the DS response, returning a KeyEntry. + * + * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DS. + * @param vq: validator query state + * @param id: module id. + * @param rcode: rcode result value. + * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). + * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info. + * @param ke: the key entry to return. It returns + * is_bad if the DS response fails to validate, is_null if the + * DS response indicated an end to secure space, is_good if the DS + * validated. It returns ke=NULL if the DS response indicated that the + * request wasn't a delegation point. + * @return 0 on servfail error (malloc failure). + */ +static int +ds_response_to_ke(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, + int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo, + struct key_entry_key** ke) +{ + struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; + char* reason = NULL; + enum val_classification subtype; + if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { + char* rc = ldns_pkt_rcode2str(rcode); + /* errors here pretty much break validation */ + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS response was error, thus bogus"); + errinf(qstate, rc); + errinf(qstate, "no DS"); + free(rc); + goto return_bogus; + } + + subtype = val_classify_response(BIT_RD, qinfo, qinfo, msg->rep, 0); + if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) { + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds; + enum sec_status sec; + ds = reply_find_answer_rrset(qinfo, msg->rep); + /* If there was no DS rrset, then we have mis-classified + * this message. */ + if(!ds) { + log_warn("internal error: POSITIVE DS response was " + "missing DS."); + errinf(qstate, "no DS record"); + goto return_bogus; + } + /* Verify only returns BOGUS or SECURE. If the rrset is + * bogus, then we are done. */ + sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(qstate->env, ve, ds, + vq->key_entry, &reason); + if(sec != sec_status_secure) { + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS rrset in DS response did " + "not verify"); + errinf(qstate, reason); + goto return_bogus; + } + + /* If the DS rrset validates, we still have to make sure + * that they are usable. */ + if(!val_dsset_isusable(ds)) { + /* If they aren't usable, then we treat it like + * there was no DS. */ + *ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, + qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, + ub_packed_rrset_ttl(ds), *qstate->env->now); + return (*ke) != NULL; + } + + /* Otherwise, we return the positive response. */ + log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validated DS", qinfo); + *ke = key_entry_create_rrset(qstate->region, + qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, ds, + NULL, *qstate->env->now); + return (*ke) != NULL; + } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NODATA || + subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR) { + /* NODATA means that the qname exists, but that there was + * no DS. This is a pretty normal case. */ + uint32_t proof_ttl = 0; + enum sec_status sec; + + /* make sure there are NSECs or NSEC3s with signatures */ + if(!val_has_signed_nsecs(msg->rep, &reason)) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "no NSECs: %s", reason); + errinf(qstate, reason); + goto return_bogus; + } + + /* For subtype Name Error. + * attempt ANS 2.8.1.0 compatibility where it sets rcode + * to nxdomain, but really this is an Nodata/Noerror response. + * Find and prove the empty nonterminal in that case */ + + /* Try to prove absence of the DS with NSEC */ + sec = val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply( + qstate->env, ve, qinfo, msg->rep, vq->key_entry, + &proof_ttl, &reason); + switch(sec) { + case sec_status_secure: + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the " + "referral proved no DS."); + *ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, + qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, + qinfo->qclass, proof_ttl, + *qstate->env->now); + return (*ke) != NULL; + case sec_status_insecure: + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the " + "referral proved not a delegation point"); + *ke = NULL; + return 1; + case sec_status_bogus: + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the " + "referral did not prove no DS."); + errinf(qstate, reason); + goto return_bogus; + case sec_status_unchecked: + default: + /* NSEC proof did not work, try next */ + break; + } + + sec = nsec3_prove_nods(qstate->env, ve, + msg->rep->rrsets + msg->rep->an_numrrsets, + msg->rep->ns_numrrsets, qinfo, vq->key_entry, &reason); + switch(sec) { + case sec_status_insecure: + /* case insecure also continues to unsigned + * space. If nsec3-iter-count too high or + * optout, then treat below as unsigned */ + case sec_status_secure: + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the " + "referral proved no DS."); + *ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, + qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, + qinfo->qclass, proof_ttl, + *qstate->env->now); + return (*ke) != NULL; + case sec_status_indeterminate: + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the " + "referral proved no delegation"); + *ke = NULL; + return 1; + case sec_status_bogus: + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the " + "referral did not prove no DS."); + errinf(qstate, reason); + goto return_bogus; + case sec_status_unchecked: + default: + /* NSEC3 proof did not work */ + break; + } + + /* Apparently, no available NSEC/NSEC3 proved NODATA, so + * this is BOGUS. */ + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS %s ran out of options, so return " + "bogus", val_classification_to_string(subtype)); + errinf(qstate, "no DS but also no proof of that"); + goto return_bogus; + } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME || + subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER) { + /* if the CNAME matches the exact name we want and is signed + * properly, then also, we are sure that no DS exists there, + * much like a NODATA proof */ + enum sec_status sec; + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* cname; + cname = reply_find_rrset_section_an(msg->rep, qinfo->qname, + qinfo->qname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME, qinfo->qclass); + if(!cname) { + errinf(qstate, "validator classified CNAME but no " + "CNAME of the queried name for DS"); + goto return_bogus; + } + if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)cname->entry.data)->rrsig_count + == 0) { + if(msg->rep->an_numrrsets != 0 && ntohs(msg->rep-> + rrsets[0]->rk.type)==LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) { + errinf(qstate, "DS got DNAME answer"); + } else { + errinf(qstate, "DS got unsigned CNAME answer"); + } + goto return_bogus; + } + sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(qstate->env, ve, cname, + vq->key_entry, &reason); + if(sec == sec_status_secure) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "CNAME validated, " + "proof that DS does not exist"); + /* and that it is not a referral point */ + *ke = NULL; + return 1; + } + errinf(qstate, "CNAME in DS response was not secure."); + errinf(qstate, reason); + goto return_bogus; + } else { + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Encountered an unhandled type of " + "DS response, thus bogus."); + errinf(qstate, "no DS and"); + if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->rep->flags) != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { + char* rc = ldns_pkt_rcode2str( + FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->rep->flags)); + errinf(qstate, rc); + free(rc); + } else errinf(qstate, val_classification_to_string(subtype)); + errinf(qstate, "message fails to prove that"); + goto return_bogus; + } +return_bogus: + *ke = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, qinfo->qname, + qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, + BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *qstate->env->now); + return (*ke) != NULL; +} + +/** + * Process DS response. Called from inform_supers. + * Because it is in inform_supers, the mesh itself is busy doing callbacks + * for a state that is to be deleted soon; don't touch the mesh; instead + * set a state in the super, as the super will be reactivated soon. + * Perform processing to determine what state to set in the super. + * + * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DS. + * @param vq: validator query state + * @param id: module id. + * @param rcode: rcode result value. + * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). + * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info. + * @param origin: the origin of msg. + */ +static void +process_ds_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, + int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo, + struct sock_list* origin) +{ + struct key_entry_key* dske = NULL; + uint8_t* olds = vq->empty_DS_name; + vq->empty_DS_name = NULL; + if(!ds_response_to_ke(qstate, vq, id, rcode, msg, qinfo, &dske)) { + log_err("malloc failure in process_ds_response"); + vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */ + vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; + return; + } + if(dske == NULL) { + vq->empty_DS_name = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, + qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len); + if(!vq->empty_DS_name) { + log_err("malloc failure in empty_DS_name"); + vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */ + vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; + return; + } + vq->empty_DS_len = qinfo->qname_len; + vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; + /* ds response indicated that we aren't on a delegation point. + * Keep the forState.state on FINDKEY. */ + } else if(key_entry_isgood(dske)) { + vq->ds_rrset = key_entry_get_rrset(dske, qstate->region); + if(!vq->ds_rrset) { + log_err("malloc failure in process DS"); + vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */ + vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; + return; + } + vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; /* fresh blacklist for next part*/ + /* Keep the forState.state on FINDKEY. */ + } else if(key_entry_isbad(dske) + && vq->restart_count < VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { + vq->empty_DS_name = olds; + val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region, origin, 1); + qstate->errinf = NULL; + vq->restart_count++; + } else { + if(key_entry_isbad(dske)) { + errinf_origin(qstate, origin); + errinf_dname(qstate, "for DS", qinfo->qname); + } + /* NOTE: the reason for the DS to be not good (that is, + * either bad or null) should have been logged by + * dsResponseToKE. */ + vq->key_entry = dske; + /* The FINDKEY phase has ended, so move on. */ + vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; + } +} + +/** + * Process DNSKEY response. Called from inform_supers. + * Sets the key entry in the state. + * Because it is in inform_supers, the mesh itself is busy doing callbacks + * for a state that is to be deleted soon; don't touch the mesh; instead + * set a state in the super, as the super will be reactivated soon. + * Perform processing to determine what state to set in the super. + * + * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DNSKEY. + * @param vq: validator query state + * @param id: module id. + * @param rcode: rcode result value. + * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). + * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info. + * @param origin: the origin of msg. + */ +static void +process_dnskey_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, + int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo, + struct sock_list* origin) +{ + struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; + struct key_entry_key* old = vq->key_entry; + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey = NULL; + int downprot; + char* reason = NULL; + + if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) + dnskey = reply_find_answer_rrset(qinfo, msg->rep); + + if(dnskey == NULL) { + /* bad response */ + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Missing DNSKEY RRset in response to " + "DNSKEY query."); + if(vq->restart_count < VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { + val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region, + origin, 1); + qstate->errinf = NULL; + vq->restart_count++; + return; + } + vq->key_entry = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, + qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, + BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *qstate->env->now); + if(!vq->key_entry) { + log_err("alloc failure in missing dnskey response"); + /* key_entry is NULL for failure in Validate */ + } + errinf(qstate, "No DNSKEY record"); + errinf_origin(qstate, origin); + errinf_dname(qstate, "for key", qinfo->qname); + vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; + return; + } + if(!vq->ds_rrset) { + log_err("internal error: no DS rrset for new DNSKEY response"); + vq->key_entry = NULL; + vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; + return; + } + downprot = 1; + vq->key_entry = val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(qstate->region, qstate->env, + ve, dnskey, vq->ds_rrset, downprot, &reason); + + if(!vq->key_entry) { + log_err("out of memory in verify new DNSKEYs"); + vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; + return; + } + /* If the key entry isBad or isNull, then we can move on to the next + * state. */ + if(!key_entry_isgood(vq->key_entry)) { + if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) { + if(vq->restart_count < VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { + val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, + qstate->region, origin, 1); + qstate->errinf = NULL; + vq->restart_count++; + vq->key_entry = old; + return; + } + verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Did not match a DS to a DNSKEY, " + "thus bogus."); + errinf(qstate, reason); + errinf_origin(qstate, origin); + errinf_dname(qstate, "for key", qinfo->qname); + } + vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; + vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; + return; + } + vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; + qstate->errinf = NULL; + + /* The DNSKEY validated, so cache it as a trusted key rrset. */ + key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry, qstate); + + /* If good, we stay in the FINDKEY state. */ + log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validated DNSKEY", qinfo); +} + +/** + * Process prime response + * Sets the key entry in the state. + * + * @param qstate: query state that is validating and primed a trust anchor. + * @param vq: validator query state + * @param id: module id. + * @param rcode: rcode result value. + * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). + * @param origin: the origin of msg. + */ +static void +process_prime_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, + int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct sock_list* origin) +{ + struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset = NULL; + struct trust_anchor* ta = anchor_find(qstate->env->anchors, + vq->trust_anchor_name, vq->trust_anchor_labs, + vq->trust_anchor_len, vq->qchase.qclass); + if(!ta) { + /* trust anchor revoked, restart with less anchors */ + vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; + if(!vq->trust_anchor_name) + vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; /* break a loop */ + vq->trust_anchor_name = NULL; + return; + } + /* Fetch and validate the keyEntry that corresponds to the + * current trust anchor. */ + if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { + dnskey_rrset = reply_find_rrset_section_an(msg->rep, + ta->name, ta->namelen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, + ta->dclass); + } + if(ta->autr) { + if(!autr_process_prime(qstate->env, ve, ta, dnskey_rrset)) { + /* trust anchor revoked, restart with less anchors */ + vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; + vq->trust_anchor_name = NULL; + return; + } + } + vq->key_entry = primeResponseToKE(dnskey_rrset, ta, qstate, id); + lock_basic_unlock(&ta->lock); + if(vq->key_entry) { + if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry) + && vq->restart_count < VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { + val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region, + origin, 1); + qstate->errinf = NULL; + vq->restart_count++; + vq->key_entry = NULL; + vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; + return; + } + vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; + errinf_origin(qstate, origin); + errinf_dname(qstate, "for trust anchor", ta->name); + /* store the freshly primed entry in the cache */ + key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry, qstate); + } + + /* If the result of the prime is a null key, skip the FINDKEY state.*/ + if(!vq->key_entry || key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry) || + key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) { + vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; + } + /* the qstate will be reactivated after inform_super is done */ +} + +/** + * Process DLV response. Called from inform_supers. + * Because it is in inform_supers, the mesh itself is busy doing callbacks + * for a state that is to be deleted soon; don't touch the mesh; instead + * set a state in the super, as the super will be reactivated soon. + * Perform processing to determine what state to set in the super. + * + * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DLV. + * @param vq: validator query state + * @param id: module id. + * @param rcode: rcode result value. + * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). + * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info. + */ +static void +process_dlv_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, + int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo) +{ + struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; + + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "process dlv response to super"); + if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { + /* lookup failed, set in vq to give up */ + vq->dlv_status = dlv_error; + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "response is error"); + return; + } + if(msg->rep->security != sec_status_secure) { + vq->dlv_status = dlv_error; + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "response is not secure, %s", + sec_status_to_string(msg->rep->security)); + return; + } + /* was the lookup a success? validated DLV? */ + if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->rep->flags) == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && + msg->rep->an_numrrsets == 1 && + msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure && + ntohs(msg->rep->rrsets[0]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV && + ntohs(msg->rep->rrsets[0]->rk.rrset_class) == qinfo->qclass && + query_dname_compare(msg->rep->rrsets[0]->rk.dname, + vq->dlv_lookup_name) == 0) { + /* yay! it is just like a DS */ + vq->ds_rrset = (struct ub_packed_rrset_key*) + regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, + msg->rep->rrsets[0], sizeof(*vq->ds_rrset)); + if(!vq->ds_rrset) { + log_err("out of memory in process_dlv"); + return; + } + vq->ds_rrset->entry.key = vq->ds_rrset; + vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname = (uint8_t*)regional_alloc_init( + qstate->region, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, + vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len); + if(!vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname) { + log_err("out of memory in process_dlv"); + vq->dlv_status = dlv_error; + return; + } + vq->ds_rrset->entry.data = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, + vq->ds_rrset->entry.data, + packed_rrset_sizeof(vq->ds_rrset->entry.data)); + if(!vq->ds_rrset->entry.data) { + log_err("out of memory in process_dlv"); + vq->dlv_status = dlv_error; + return; + } + packed_rrset_ptr_fixup(vq->ds_rrset->entry.data); + /* make vq do a DNSKEY query next up */ + vq->dlv_status = dlv_success; + return; + } + /* store NSECs into negative cache */ + val_neg_addreply(ve->neg_cache, msg->rep); + + /* was the lookup a failure? + * if we have to go up into the DLV for a higher DLV anchor + * then set this in the vq, so it can make queries when activated. + * See if the NSECs indicate that we should look for higher DLV + * or, that there is no DLV securely */ + if(!val_nsec_check_dlv(qinfo, msg->rep, &vq->dlv_lookup_name, + &vq->dlv_lookup_name_len)) { + vq->dlv_status = dlv_error; + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec error"); + return; + } + if(!dname_subdomain_c(vq->dlv_lookup_name, + qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name)) { + vq->dlv_status = dlv_there_is_no_dlv; + return; + } + vq->dlv_status = dlv_ask_higher; +} + +/* + * inform validator super. + * + * @param qstate: query state that finished. + * @param id: module id. + * @param super: the qstate to inform. + */ +void +val_inform_super(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id, + struct module_qstate* super) +{ + struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)super->minfo[id]; + log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: inform_super, sub is", + &qstate->qinfo); + log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "super is", &super->qinfo); + if(!vq) { + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "super: has no validator state"); + return; + } + if(vq->wait_prime_ta) { + vq->wait_prime_ta = 0; + process_prime_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode, + qstate->return_msg, qstate->reply_origin); + return; + } + if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS) { + process_ds_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode, + qstate->return_msg, &qstate->qinfo, + qstate->reply_origin); + return; + } else if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY) { + process_dnskey_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode, + qstate->return_msg, &qstate->qinfo, + qstate->reply_origin); + return; + } else if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV) { + process_dlv_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode, + qstate->return_msg, &qstate->qinfo); + return; + } + log_err("internal error in validator: no inform_supers possible"); +} + +void +val_clear(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id) +{ + if(!qstate) + return; + /* everything is allocated in the region, so assign NULL */ + qstate->minfo[id] = NULL; +} + +size_t +val_get_mem(struct module_env* env, int id) +{ + struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)env->modinfo[id]; + if(!ve) + return 0; + return sizeof(*ve) + key_cache_get_mem(ve->kcache) + + val_neg_get_mem(ve->neg_cache) + + anchors_get_mem(env->anchors) + + sizeof(size_t)*2*ve->nsec3_keyiter_count; +} + +/** + * The validator function block + */ +static struct module_func_block val_block = { + "validator", + &val_init, &val_deinit, &val_operate, &val_inform_super, &val_clear, + &val_get_mem +}; + +struct module_func_block* +val_get_funcblock(void) +{ + return &val_block; +} + +const char* +val_state_to_string(enum val_state state) +{ + switch(state) { + case VAL_INIT_STATE: return "VAL_INIT_STATE"; + case VAL_FINDKEY_STATE: return "VAL_FINDKEY_STATE"; + case VAL_VALIDATE_STATE: return "VAL_VALIDATE_STATE"; + case VAL_FINISHED_STATE: return "VAL_FINISHED_STATE"; + case VAL_DLVLOOKUP_STATE: return "VAL_DLVLOOKUP_STATE"; + } + return "UNKNOWN VALIDATOR STATE"; +} + |